To Start A War: How the Bush Administration Took America into Iraq by Robert Draper was a well written historical account of the internal discussions within the Bush administration leading up to the Iraq War. The author does a great job contextualizing this time in America; prior to 9/11 America's moral superiority was related to the Soviet Union; America was unassailable in its righteousness. Looking back, I vaguely knew there was insufficient evidence to go into Iraq, but this was shocking.
Prior to 9/11 the CIA repeatedly gave the Bush admin information that suspected 9/11 and Al-Qaeda's involvement. After 9/11, Bush asked, "who did this?," as though he hadn't been told for weeks (p42). Later, the same CIA analysts who knew 9/11 would happen were cut out of the process completely, as the Bush admin was set on invading Iraq. The author demonstrated that, leading up to the Iraq War was a myopic administration using circular logic, shutting out skepticism, and filled with internal chaos; a group so disconnected from the realities of war, they insisted their rightness, despite the expertise of people they hired. Countless pieces of intel were unduly given credibility and later were shown to be false. "The cake had been baked before the president had an opportunity to order it," (p402). People whose jobs specialized in war planning and "the day after" were "thwarted by the Defense Department," (p270) with an arrogant insistence on a 'light footprint'.
Additionally, even external political actors, former advisors, current advisors, and paid experts all gave warnings to Bush about shaky evidence and the need for comprehensive and realistic war planning. All went unheeded. Leaders of Jordan and Egypt, Britain, France, and more, all warned the Bush administration that invading Iraq was unwise and "would create one hundred Osama Bin Ladens" (p111).
Further, one of the more appalling components was how the conclusion was reached before the evidence, and the Bush admin truly misused the American public's trust in him. The communication around 9/11 and terrorism conflated evidence and misled people. The "American public could be exhorted 'to take what we don't know as seriously as what we do,'" (p162). Bush administration officials placed "suspicion on par with knowledge" (p173). The three judgments on which war in Iraq was predicated all proved to be untrue and were listed as low likely in intelligence reports (p248). Additionally, in response to a Congressman's concerns about war, a Bush aide responded 'Well, Congressman, we really don't need your vote," (p252). "Rumsfeld did not view rebuilding broken countries as part of his job description," (p264). "The US is ready to work with...inspectors...but we are already ready to discredit [them]," (p283). The administration clearly decided that America would invade Iraq, regardless of evidence to justify it or that it would 'work.'
This was an enlightening book and one of the first I've read that dives into foreign policy. Thanks to my brother, Jeremy, for the recommendation.